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Abstract
We investigate whether gender differences in strategic behavior de-
pend on the perceived gender bias of strategic interactions. We use two
weakly dominance solvable games where a prize is at stake. The first
one is the two-person beauty contest, where strategies are numbers and
players must perform mathematical operations. The second is the novel
"gaze coach game", where strategies are photographs of the eye region
and the two players must assign emotional states to these images. We
find that males display significantly higher strategic sophistication than
females in the first game but not in the second one, which is perceived
to be female biased. However, females are underrepresented among top
performers in both games.
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1 Introduction
In its investigation of the reasons driving the persistent gender differences in
labor market outcomes, one strand of the literature has highlighted the role
of gender differences in competitive performance. Evidence from experiments
and observational data suggests that women perform worse than men in tour-
naments (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini,
2004; Backus et al. 2016). However, this effect seems to be mediated by the
perceived gender-bias of the task at hand; females perform as well as males
when the task is perceived to be female-friendly (Guenther, Arslan, Schwieren
and Strobel, 2010; Shurchkov, 2012; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2017).1
In this paper we explore whether the effect of perceived gender biases on
tournament performance translates to competitive strategic interactions. By
competitive strategic interactions we mean games where a prize is at stake and
where being strategically sophisticated enhances one’s chances of victory.
Why is this important? Strategic thinking is crucial in many human in-
teractions. Success in social, educational and workplace interactions rests
on understanding that friends, competitors, employers and co-workers adjust
their behavior to incentives and the behavior of others. Individuals with "the-
ory of mind," that is, the ability to assess others’ thoughts, emotions and
intentions (Baron-Cohen, 1991), are better at making and maintaining social
relations and obtain better educational results (Fe, Gill and Prowse, 2019).
Chou (2018) show that strategic sophistication is positively related to labor
and household income. In addition, they observe differential effects of strate-
gic sophistication on personal income and in the marriage market by gender.
Hence, understanding whether the perceived gender bias of strategic interac-
tions affects the behavior of women and men can contribute to explain the
prevalence of gender differences in labor market and life outcomes.
The available evidence on gender differences in strategic sophistication
is quite mixed. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), Ostling, Wang, Chou and
Camerer (2011) and Arad and Rubinstein (2012) find slight differences in fa-
1See Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Niederle (2016) for reviews of this literature.
vor of men in the beauty contest, the LUPI game and the 11-20 game respec-
tively. Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017) find differences in favor of women in
the beauty contest when gender is primed and in favor of men under no mon-
etary incentives. Others however (e.g. Burnham et al., 2009; Brañas-Garza,
Garcia-Muñoz and Hernan, 2012) find no gender differences. However, so far,
no paper has studied whether the perceived gender-bias of strategic interac-
tions affects behaviour and thus the relative performance of women and men
in competitive games.
Our basic hypothesis is that the perceived gender-bias of a strategic inter-
action might affect game form recognition (Chou, McConnell, Nagel and Plott,
2009). This might be driven by differences in attention and engagement, which
may lead to an incomplete understanding of how combinations of strategies
produce outcomes. The perceived gender bias of the interaction may also lead
to different levels of strategic awareness, defined as the realization that playing
requires reasoning about others (Fehr and Huck, 2016). Differences in strategic
awareness and in game form recognition are related to Selten’s (1978) "3-level
theory", which broke down strategic reasoning into three levels of increasing
complexity: routine, imagination and rationality. Our hypothesis is that the
perceived gender bias of the strategic interaction might affect differentially
the willingness of men and women to engage in these levels of understanding,
which then results in differences in strategic sophistication.
It is well-known that changes in the game form can affect behavior dra-
matically (e.g. Cox and James, 2012). We focus instead on changes in the
nature of the strategy set and what it takes to win the game. To that end
we employ two two-person competitive games. The first one is the two-person
beauty contest (Grosskopf and Nagel, 2008). In this game, available strategies
are numbers and winning requires a mathematical computation (approaching
two thirds of the average response of the two players). This game thus aims
to exploit the negative stereotype associating women to math (e.g. Nosek,
Banaji and Greenwald, 2002).
The second game is the novel "gaze coach game", where participants must
select a subset of imaginary players to participate in a tournament against the
team selected by another participant. These made-up players are presented
by photographs of their eye region. Winning requires associating emotional
states to these images correctly. The design employs the Eyes test (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001), which measures the ability to attribute and recognize
mental states in others. The gaze coach game thus exploits the commonly
held stereotype suggesting that women are more empathic and have a greater
capacity to recognize emotions. This stereotype is borne out by large studies
using the Eyes test; women score slightly but significantly higher than men
(Schiffer et al., 2013; Baron-Cohen et al., 2015).
Both games have a weakly dominant strategy so a player sophisticated
enough to identify that strategy never loses. That these games are weakly
dominance solvable also implies that beliefs about the strategic sophistication
of the opponent are irrelevant. This is important for two reasons. First,
because game form recognition may affect belief formation (Bosch-Rosa and
Meissner, 2020). Second, because there may be gender differences in beliefs
about the sophistication of other players (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2017) and
on how men and women act upon these beliefs (Huberman and Rubinstein,
2001).
In the two-person beauty contest, we find that men are significantly more
likely to pick the weakly dominant strategy, but also that they are more likely
to pick very high numbers. As a result, 1) the variance of expected payoffs
for males (but not the mean) is significantly higher than for females and 2)
there are fewer women among the top performers. This is consistent with
the patterns in math PISA scores in OECD countries (Machin and Pekkari-
nen, 2008; OECD, 2020) and in American Math Competitions (Ellison and
Swanson, 2010).
The gaze coach game is perceived as more female-friendly both by partici-
pants and by an out-experiment sample. In this game, we find no significant
gender differences in the proportion of participants who pick the weakly dom-
inant strategy nor in expected payoffs. However, once we correct for the mis-
takes participants made when assigning emotions to the images, we observe
that women are again underrepresented among the top performers.
We explore the reasons behind these results by analyzing the responses
to a post-experiment questionnaire. In the beauty contest, we observe that
females display higher strategic awareness than males, i.e. they are more likely
to recognize the situation as a game, but they seem to understand worse how
combinations of strategies translate into outcomes. In both games we find
that participants who believe that the other gender is better at the game
display lower strategic sophistication. Taken together, this results would seem
to corroborate that stereotypes and perceived gender biases influence strategic
behavior in competitive games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the experimental design and results of Study 1, the two-person beauty con-
test. Section 3 does the same for Study 2, the gaze coach game. Section 4
concludes. The appendix contains the experimental instructions, the post-
experiment questionnaire and additional tables and figures.
2 Study 1: The two-person beauty contest
2.1 Experimental design and procedure
The two-person beauty contest game was originally proposed by Grosskopf
and Nagel (2008). Two players choose an integer between 0 and 100 aiming
to guess two-thirds of the average number chosen in the pair. This game has
a unique Nash equilibrium were both players respond zero. Choosing zero is
also a weakly dominant strategy. The game is isomorphic to one where the
player who chooses the smallest number in the pair wins; hence, the lower the
number a participant picks the larger their probability of winning. Contrary to
the n-player beauty contest, beliefs about the strategic sophistication of others
are irrelevant.2 Any gender differences in the choice of the weakly dominant
strategy can thus be safely attributed to a failure in game form recognition
rather than to the gender differences in beliefs observed by Rubinstein and
2For a similar approach, see the one-player beauty contest studied by Bosch-Rosa and
Meissner (2020).
Huberman (2001) and Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017).
This study was conducted at the School of Economics and Business of
the University of Barcelona in 2016. The School is large and hosts students
in Economics, Business, Statistics and Sociology. Participants were recruited
through posters, leaflets and class presentations and had no previous training
on game theory. In total, 136 people participated in the study, 50.0% of them
female. Sessions lasted between 30 and 40 minutes. Participants received a
five euros show up fee and five additional euros for winning the prize in their
pair (2.50 euros if both participants picked the same number). The average
payment was, by construction, 7.50 euros.
The experiment was conducted in a large lecture theatre using pen and
paper. We ran two sessions with 62 and 64 participants each. After arriving,
participants were seated with plenty of space in between. They were asked to
read the instructions (see Appendix A) along with one of the experimenters,
who did so aloud. Participants played anonymously against a randomly cho-
sen person in the session.3 They took their decision and recorded it in their
reporting sheet. When they all finished and reporting sheets were collected,
participants were asked to fill up a brief questionnaire designed to measure
beliefs, explicit gender stereotypes and types of failures in game form recogni-
tion (see Appendix A). Experimenters answered privately any questions par-
ticipants had and provided no feedback at any time. At the end of the session,
participants were called one by one to the main desk by their participant num-
ber. There, they were informed about the response of the participant they had
been randomly matched with and were paid accordingly. Then, they signed
their receipt and left the room.
2.2 Results
We compare responses by gender along four dimensions: The fraction of sub-
jects who chose the weakly dominant strategy, average response, median re-
sponse and average expected payoff. To compute the latter we followed Nagel,
3During the session, one of the experimenters generated a random matching of partici-
pants into pairs using https://www.randomlists.com/team-generator.
Buehren and Frank (2017): We combined the response of each participant
with the choice of each of the other participants in their session and took the
average of all the outcomes by giving 1 to each win, 0.5 to draws and zero to
losses.
The results of these comparisons are contained in Table 1 below. The
first noticeable result is that only about one in six participants picked zero.
This proportion is similar to the one Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) observed in
their study (10%) and falls in between the two samples studied in Chou et al.
(2009), who report that 0% of students in a community college and 46% of
Caltech students chose zero.
Choices of zero Average Median Expected payoff
Males 25.00% 32.79 25.5 0.517
Females 7.35% 33.30 33 0.482
All 16.17% 33.05 30 0.5
Table 1. Main statistics of Study 1 by gender.
The second main result in Table 1 is that the proportion of participants
who chose the weakly dominant strategy differs by gender (Proportion test p =
0.004).4 This would suggest that males display higher strategic sophistication
than females in this game, where strategies are numbers and winning requires
a mathematical operation. This conclusion is reinforced if we compare the
cumulative distributions of responses by gender. Figure 1 below shows that the
fraction of participants who chose very small numbers is larger for men than
for women, each depicted with their stereotypical color. The Davidson and
Duclos (2000) test of stochastic dominance corroborates this:5 The test returns
that the distribution of responses chosen by females first-order stochastically
4All tests reported are two-tailed unless explicitly stated.
5This test compares distributions at several points. A distribution is said to first sto-
chastically dominate another if for all comparison points for which differences between the
two distributions are statistically significant the sign of these differences is identical. We
report the results of all comparisons employing this test in Appendix B.
dominates the distribution of responses by males (Table A1 in Appendix B).
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of responses by gender.
Result 1 In the two-person beauty contest, men chose the weakly dominant
strategy more often than women.
Table 1 also shows that there were no significant gender differences in
average responses, median responses (despite the large gap) or in expected
payoffs. The reason is that, as Figure 1 already suggests, more males than
females selected very large numbers. This difference is not large enough to be
picked up by the stochastic dominance test, but it is for expected payoffs as
we show next.
The left panel in Figure 2 below depicts the Kernel density of expected
payoffs by gender. It shows that the distribution for males has a larger variance
than the one for females. The male-female variance ratio in expected payoff
is 1.60, which is significantly different from one (Variance-comparison test,
p = 0.027). This difference in variances is strikingly similar to the pattern
observed in PISA scores for math and reading in most OECD countries, where
boys display more extreme performances than girls (Machin and Pekkarinen,
2008). This pattern is also present in the most recent PISA 2018 (OECD,
2020).
The right panel in Figure 2 shows another significant difference: The cumu-
lative distribution of expected payoffs obtained by males first order stochasti-
cally dominates the one for females. The Davidson-Duclos test confirms that
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Figure 2: Density and cumulative distributions of expected payoffs by gender.
These results suggest that fewer women than men attain high expected
payoffs in the two-player beauty contest. To investigate this gender difference
in top performances further, we next plot the percentage of females at several
top percentage thresholds. Perfect equality in performance by gender would
require a 50% of females at all top percentages in the distribution (as they
formed 50% of the sample). However, Figure 3 shows that the proportion
of women is around 50% for top percentages up to the top 45%. It declines
sharply after that and becomes significantly lower than 50% for the top 15%
(one-sample proportion test, p = 0.010) and beyond. Despite half of partici-
pants in our study were females, they only represented a quarter of those who
performed in the top 15%.
Figure 3: Percentage of females by top percentage of expected payoff.
Result 2 In the two-person beauty contest, the distribution of expected pay-
offs for males has a higher variance and first order stochastically domi-
nates the distribution for females. As a result, women are significantly
underrepresented among top performers.
This result is again eerily similar to the pattern of scores observed in math
exams and competitions. Ellison and Swanson (2010) show male outnumber
females by a ratio of two to one among students scoring 800 in the SAT Math.
This representation gap is even more acute at the top 1% of performers in
American Math Competitions, where the male-female ratio exceeds ten to one.
The underrepresentation of girls among best scorers in the math component of
PISA is also a common and stable feature for most OECD countries (Breda,
Jouini and Napp, 2018).
2.3 Beliefs and gender bias
To delve into these results, we next analyze the responses to the questionnaire
we administered at the end of the experiment. The questions aimed to un-
derstand how participants made their choices and to elicit beliefs about the
perceived gender bias of the game. Beliefs were not elicited in an incentive-
compatible manner since the behavior of others plays no role and participants
should not have acted upon their beliefs. However, these beliefs can be im-
portant if the level of game form recognition depends on the perceived relative
strategic ability of the own gender.6
Contrary to our expectations, the answers to the question "Which sex is
better at this game?" do not suggest that participants perceived the two-
person beauty contest to be male-biased. Figure 4 below breaks down their
responses by gender. The distribution displays no significant gender differences
(Chi-square, p = 0.170). More participants believe that females are better at
this game than in the other way around. A very similar picture emerges in
an out-experiment sample coming from the same population (n = 134), who
responded to this question online (see Figure A1 in Appendix C).7 This would
seem at odds with the gender differences we observe in behavior. Note however
that more women than men thought that men are better at the game.
Figure 4: Responses by gender to questionnaire in Study 1.
Beliefs about which sex is better at the game correlate with strategic so-
phistication, as Table 2 below shows. Participants who thought the other sex
6We cannot rule out that participants used their responses in the questionnaire to ra-
tionalize their choices despite the absence of any interim feedback. For that reason, the
relationships between beliefs and actions we dicuss in this subsection can only be correla-
tions.
7The questionnaire was sent to people in our subject pool who had not taken part in the
experiment. They answered questions 2 to 4 in the questionnaire at the end of Appendix
B. Four 10 euro prizes were randomly awarded to those who participated in the survey.
is better at this game chose the weakly dominant strategy significantly less of-
ten than the rest of participants (one-tailed proportion test p = 0.041). This
difference is marginally significant by gender (p = 0.061 for males; p = 0.068
for females). In the case of females, the difference is most striking since no
woman who believed that men are better at the game picked zero.




Table 2. Choice of zero by gender and belief.
This result corroborates that players’beliefs about the relative superiority
of their group in strategic interactions relate to their strategic sophistication.
Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017) observed in the n-player beauty contest that
women who believed their gender to be better at the game displayed greater
depth of reasoning when gender was primed. We observe a similar association
for all participants and in the absence of gender priming. The results of Study 2
below offer further evidence of this relationship. For that reason, we postpone
formally stating this as a result until Section 3.
2.4 Failures in game form recognition
Participants who did not select the weakly dominant strategy failed to recog-
nize the form of the game. This failure might range from a lack of strategic
awareness to a misunderstanding of the relationship between choices and out-
comes. To analyze this, we look next at the responses to the question in the
post-experiment questionnaire "How did you choose your answer?"
Following Chou et al. (2009), we coded the responses to this question into
four type of failures: Lack of attention, strategic unawareness, unclear rules
about how the winner is determined, and use of beliefs about the behavior of
the opponent. These categories are ordered from a poorer to a better under-
standing of the game as illustrated in the selection of responses contained in
Table 3 below.
Table 3. Illustration of failures in game form recognition: responses to the
post-experiment questionnaire.
Although these categories are constructed from self-reports,8 participants
in these groups behaved differently. Figure 6 below shows that those who
failed to select the dominant strategy because they used beliefs about the
sophistication of the opponent picked significantly lower numbers and had
significantly higher expected payoffs in average than participants who failed
to pick zero for other reasons. This is corroborated by a comparison of their
median response and expected payoff, which are significantly different from
those of the rest of participants who selected weakly dominated strategies
8To minimise classification errors, answers were coded independently by the two authors.
Disagreements were then discussed jointly. Those which could not be resolved were left
unclassified together with too brief and incomplete answers (5 out of the 117 participants
who did not pick zero).
(Median test, p < 0.001 and p < 0.001). This would indicate that participants
who reported to have entertained beliefs about their opponent understood the
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Figure 5: Average response and expected payoff by type of failure.
Let us now study gender differences in game-form recognition. Figure
6 contains the frequencies of type of failure by gender. The distributions
of answers are marginally different (Chi-square test, p = 0.072). The most
common type of failure in the sample as a whole is a lack of understanding
of how combinations of strategies produce outcomes (36.7%). Females fall
more frequently into this error than men. On the other hand, men are more
likely than women to commit basic mistakes due to inattention and strategic
unawareness. This is consistent with Result 2 above, showing that men are
more likely to pick both the weakly dominant strategy and very high numbers.
Figure 6: Failures in game form recognition by gender.
Result 3 Women show higher strategic awareness than men in the two-person
beauty contest. However, they struggle more to understand how choices
produce outcomes.
3 Study 2: The gaze coach game
3.1 Experimental design and procedure
In the gaze coach game, participants played the role of coaches who must
select two out of a set of four imaginary players to participate in a tournament
against the team selected by another participant. The game is inspired by
Arad (2012) but, unlike in her case, there is no explicit ranking of players
and their order is irrelevant since each player in a team plays a match against
each of the two players of the opponent’s team. Thus, a tournament between
a pair of participants/coaches is composed by four matches. A win is worth
one point; a draw, 0.5 points and a loss earns zero points. The winner of the
tournament is the participant whose pair of players obtains most points.
Figure 7 below shows the outcome matrix for the game. This matrix de-
tails the result of all possible matches between any pair of players. Partici-
pants/coaches were presented with photographs of the eye regions of the four
players available. Among the six possible strategies, the weakly dominant
one is to choose the two players at the bottom of the matrix. Therefore, like
the two-person beauty contest, the gaze coach game is a weakly dominance
solvable game where beliefs about the sophistication of the opponent play no
role.
Figure 7. Outcome matrix for the gaze coach game.
However, rather than choosing photographs, participants must choose the
word that they think best describes what the player they want to select is
thinking or feeling. The set of four words they were given was "Uneasy",
"Cautious", "Anticipating", and "Contemplative". Participants were told that
each photograph corresponded to only one of the words. Hence, to select a
set of players, participants had to recognize correctly their emotional states as
portrayed in the images.
Both the images and their associated words came from the Spanish ver-
sion of Eyes test.9 The original Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Jollife, Mortimore
and Robertson, 1997) was designed as an adult test for autism and Asperger
Syndrome. This test has become a popular measure of theory of mind and
mentalizing capabilities since it requires the attribution and recognition of
mental states in others. The complete Eyes test entails matching each of 36
photographs of the eye region to the word within a set of four that best de-
scribes the mental or emotional state of the person in the image. The set of
words changes across items.
9Available at https://www.autismresearchcentre.com/tests/eyes-test-adult/. The four
words in Spanish corresponding to the images were "Inquieto", "Cauto", "Expectante" and
"Reflexivo".
We designed the gaze coach game to be perceived as a female-biased inter-
action. This expectation was based on 1) the stereotype who sees women as
more empathic and better at recognizing emotions in others; 2) the results of
the Eyes test, where neurotypical women outperform men slightly but signifi-
cantly (Schiffer et al. 2013; Baron-Cohen et al., 2015); and 3) the results of a
preliminary survey we ran with an out-sample population (n=86), where only
1.2% of participants believed males are better at the test.
To select the photographs of the four players we employed in the experi-
ment, we administered the Eyes test to the aforementioned out-sample group.
We did not find any gender difference in average scores, but we did find dif-
ferences in the percentage of correct responses in some items. We discarded
these. From the remaining ones, we selected the photographs of two men and
two women whose associated words mixed emotions with positive and nega-
tive connotations: "Anticipating" is the top male player in Figure 7 whilst
"Uneasy" is the bottom one; "Cautious" is the top female player and "Con-
templative" the bottom one. The weakly dominant strategy, which was to
select {Uneasy, Contemplative} ({U,C} henceforth), also mixed qualities with
potentally opposite connotations.
Note however, that a failure to select the weakly dominant strategy in
the experiment may come from a failure in game form recognition or/and a
failure in correctly associating photographs to words. To disentangle these two
types of error, we asked participants to assign each of the four words to one of
the four images. Subjects did this after they had selected their two preferred
players for their team. The identification task was incentivized with 20 euro
cents per correct answer. Answers in this task allow us to infer the pair of
players participants believed they were selecting.
The experiment was ran at the School of Economics of the University of
Barcelona in 2017. A total of 168 participants with no training in game theory,
51.8% of them females, took part in the experiment. No subject who partici-
pated in Study 1 took part in Study 2. We conducted a total of four sessions
with 36-56 participants each. Sessions lasted between 40 and 50 minutes. Par-
ticipants received a flat fee of five euros and five additional euros if they were
the winner in their pair (2.50 euros if they drew). The average payment was
7.90 euros, 7.50 euros from the main experiment (by construction) plus 40 euro
cents in average for the identification task. The rest of procedures for Study
2 were identical to those in Study 1.
3.2 Results
We compare responses by gender along two dimensions: The fraction of par-
ticipants who chose the weakly dominant strategy and participants’expected
payoff. The latter is again computed by averaging the scores a participant
would have obtained by combining their strategy with each of the strategies
chosen by the rest of participants in their session.
We consider two versions of these two variables. One is based on the
choices recorded by participants in their reporting sheets. The other is based
on the pair of players participants thought they were selecting as revealed by
their answers in the identification task. We call the latter the players’"true"
choices and their "true" expected payoff. The difference between both versions
of the variables is that the one based on recorded chocies includes the error in
emotion recognition, i.e. the error in matching words to photographs, whereas
the "true" version contains only the error in game form recognition. To clarify,
when constructing the "true" expected payoff we used the "true" choices of
all participants in the session. Alternatively, we could have used only the
"true" choice of the player in question whilst keeping the rest of players at
their recorded choices. Although interesting, that counterfactual presents the
problem that players with the same "true" choice in the same session can be
assigned different expected payoffs.
Table 4 below shows average results by gender. The first main result emerg-
ing from that table is that the proportion of participants who pick the weakly
dominant strategy -one out of five participants- is very similar to the one we
observed in Study 1. The proportion doubles but remains relatively low for
"true" choices, i.e. after we correct the error participants committed when
matching words to photographs. The difference in the proportion of partic-
ipants who believed they picked {U,C} from those who actually picked it is
statistically different for the whole sample and by gender, indicating that the
errors in emotion recognition were indeed frequent (McNemar test, p < 0.001
overall and for males, p = 0.002 for females). Still, it is surprising that less
than half of participants managed to find the weakly dominant strategy in a
game with context and with a relatively small strategy space.10
Females Males All
Choices of {U,C} 19.8% 20.5% 20.1%
"True" choices of {U,C} 40.7% 48.2% 44.4%
Expected payoff 0.511 0.487 0.5
"True" expected payoff 0.487 0.515 0.5
Table 4: Aggregate results by gender.
The second result emerging from Table 4 is that there are no significant
gender differences in the proportion of participants who selected the dominant
strategy (proportion test, p = 0.907 for recorded choices; p = 0.326 for "true"
choices) nor in expected payoffs (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.581 for expected
payoffs based on recorded choices; p = 0.279 for "true" expected payoffs).
We observe no gender differences in the identification task either (Chi-square,
p = 0.374), although this may be attributed to the small number of items
participants had to identify.
Result 4 There are no significant gender differences in aggregate behavior in
the gaze coach game.
Taken together, Result 1 and 4 are consistent with (but not conclusive
proof of) the idea that the perceived gender bias of competitive games has
an impact on the relative strategic sophistication of men and women. We
10As a point of comparison, Chou et al. (2009) report that when they contextualized the
two-player beauty contest as a battle between two generals, only 46% of the community
college students sampled picked zero.
observed gender differences in favor of men in the two-person beauty contest
where strategies are numbers and maths are important but no differences in
the gaze coach game, which entails recognizing emotions in others correctly.
However, a more detailed look at the results in the gaze coach game com-
plicates this picture. Figure 8 below depicts the cumulative distribution of ex-
pected and "true" expected payoffs by gender. Although they are not different
in the former case, a familiar pattern emerges in the latter: The distribution
of "true" expected payoffs for males first order stochastically dominates the
one for females. This dominance, as in the two-person beauty contest, takes
place for the highest expected payoffs, as the Davidson-Duclos test confirms
(see Table A3 in Appendix B). This suggests that women are underrepresented
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Figure 8. Cumulative distribution of expected and "true" expected payoffs
by gender.
To corroborate this finding, we plot the percentage of females by top per-
centage of expected payoff in Figure 9. For expected payoffs based on recorded
choices, which include the error in emotion recognition, the percentage of
women across all top percentages is never significantly different from 50%.11
However, for the "true" expected payoff, that is, once we remove the errors in
11Recall that the proportion of women in this sample was 51.8%. By setting the threshold
at 50% we are being conservative when estimating a potential representation gap against
women.
emotion recognition, the proportion of women at top percentages starts declin-
ing again from the top 45% until becoming significantly lower than 50% at the
top 20% (Proportion test, p = 0.045). As in the two-person beauty contest,
only a meagre quarter of performers in the top 10% are women.
Figure 9. Percentage of females by top percentage of expected payoff.
Result 5 Women are also underrepresented among the top performers in the
gaze coach game.
This result suggests that the absence of gender differences in the distri-
bution of expected payoffs based on recorded choices might be due to the
relative advantage of women when associating the players’photographs with
their emotional state. Once we remove errors in emotion recognition, the pat-
tern we observed in the two-player beauty contest reappears. One reason for
this might be that the basic interaction underlying the gaze coach game, en-
capsulated in the outcome matrix in Figure 7, might have not been perceived
as female-biased. We investigate this next.
3.3 Beliefs and gender bias
The post-experiment questionnaire for Study 2 contained the same questions
as the one for Study 1 with the exception of the last item, which was replaced
by the question "Which sex is better in the identification task?" Figure 10
shows the distribution of answers to that question and to "Which sex is better
at this game?"
A minority of participants believed that men are better in the gaze coach
game. Actually, the aggregate distribution of responses does not differ from
the one for the analogous question in Study 1 (Chi-square, p = 0.567). There
are no significant gender differences in the distribution of answers to the ques-
tion (p = 0.648). This is in sharp contrast with answers to the question about
the identification task, which confirms the stereotype associating women to
better emotion recognition. As in the out-experiment sample, a large majority
of participants (75.2%) believed that women are better at associating emo-
tional states to the images provided. This strong perceived female-bias in the
identification task contrasts with performance in the task, where, as mentioned
earlier, we did not find any significant gender difference.
Figure 10. Responses by gender to questionnaire in Study 2.
The next step is to explore whether beliefs about which sex is better at
this game correlate with strategic sophistication. Table 5 below shows that
participants who believed that the other sex is better at the game selected
the weakly dominant pair of players significantly less often than the rest of
participants (one-tailed proportion test, p = 0.004). This difference is also
significant for men (p = 0.011) but only marginally for females (p = 0.056).
However, when we look at participants’"true" choices, we find no differences
by belief (p = 0.452). This would suggest that believing that the other sex is
better at this game correlates with diffi culties in emotion recognition rather
than in game form recognition.




All "True" 45.04% 44.00%
Table 5. Choice of {U,C} by belief.
However, the distribution of correct associations in the identification task
does not differ by response to this question (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.555). In
addition, the belief that the other sex is better at the game correlates with
lower expected payoffs based on recorded choices and with lower "true" ex-
pected payoffs. Figure 11 shows the corresponding cumulative distributions by
belief. In both cases, the distribution of expected payoffs of participants who
believe the other sex is better is first-order stochastically dominated by the
distribution for the rest of participants, as the Davidson-Duclos test confirms
(see Table A4 in Appendix B). This would suggest instead that the perceived
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Figure 11. Cumulative distributions of expected payoffs by belief.
In any case, these observations together with the analogous ones in Section
2.3 for Study 1 lead us to state the following result on the relationship between
strategic sophistication and the perceived gender bias of strategic interactions.
Result 6 In both the two-player beauty contest and the gaze coach game,
participants who believe the other sex is better in the game display lower
strategic sophistication.
3.4 Failures in game form recognition
In the last part of our analysis, we explore the pattern of failures in game form
recognition and whether they exhibit any gender differences. To this end, we
study the answers to the question "How did you choose your answer?" in the
post-experiment questionnaire.
We only considered the responses of participants whose "true" choice was
a dominated strategy. This is because, unlike recorded choices, "true" choices
only contain error in game form recognition. We coded these answers following
the same procedure as in Study 1. Two broad differences emerge in the type
of failures we observe. First, due to the simpler nature of the gaze coach
game compared to the two-player beauty, no participant explicitely reported
to have seen the gaze coach game as a game of chance. Second, a new type of
error emerges. A small but non-negligible fraction of participants chose their
players based on the qualities they associated to each of the four words. They
selected the words they thought would create a good team. We classified this
type of failure as lack of attention since these participants ignored completely
the information provided in the outcome matrix.12
As in Study 1, the different types of failure in game form recognition cor-
relate with participants’ expected payoffs. Figure 12 below shows that the
average "true" expected payoff is lower for participants who failed to select
the weakly dominant strategy because of lack of attention. The median "true"
12Some examples that illustrate this type of failure are: "Cautious players contribute
calmness to teams at critical points in a tournament"; "I selected the two adjectives which
sounded more risk averse"; "Being cautious and contemplative are winning qualities in
sports".
expected payoff for the three types of failure are indeed statistically different
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Figure 12: Average "true" expected payoff by type of failure.
Figure 12 depicts the distribution of types of failures by gender. As in Study
1, the most common type of failure for both men and women (63.8%) is a lack of
understanding of the rules of the game, i.e. how choices produce outcomes. In
contrast with the two-person beauty contest, very few participants seemed to
have entertained any belief about the behavior of opponents. Also in contrast
with that game, we find no trace of significant gender differences in types of
failure (Chi-square, p = 0.609).
Figure 13: Failures in game recognition by gender.
Result 7 There are no significant gender differences in failures in game form
recognition in the gaze coach game.
4 Conclusion
Our results show that the perceived gender bias of strategic interactions affects
the behavior of men and women. Men displayed higher strategic sophistication
than women in the beauty contest, where strategies are numbers and players
must perform a mathematical operation, but not in the gaze coach problem,
where winning requires assigning emotions to images correctly. In line with
previous results (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2017), we observe that individuals
who expected the other gender to be better at the game displayed lower levels
of strategic thinking. Taken together, these findings suggest that women are
less likely to display lower strategic sophistication than men when they perceive
strategic interactions to be female-friendly. From a policy perspective, this
would imply that as long as key strategic interactions in labour markets and
in life are set and framed by men, it is natural to expect gender differences in
outcomes.
Although the two games that we have studied are admittedly not isomor-
phic, our results indicate that the underperformance of women observed in
tournaments (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004) translates
into a pervasive underrepresentation of women among top performers in com-
petitive games. The nature of strategies and of the processes required to win
seem to moderate the emergence of gender differences in strategic sophistica-
tion. But these factors do not seem to be powerful enough to fully eliminate or
reverse these differences; women remain unsettlingly underrepresented among
top performers even when the game entails a task overwhelmingly perceived as
female-biased. Based on this evidence, one logic next step would be to analyze
the existence of gender differences in strategic behaviour in non-competitive
games such as coordination games. We leave this for future research.
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A Appendix: Experimental instructions
Below we produce the translation of the experimental instructions originally
written in Spanish. These instructions were provided in paper documents which
were also read aloud by one of the experimenters (randomly chosen each ses-
sion). We present first the general instructions with the variation for Study 2 in
parentheses, then the instructions specific to each of the two studies and finally
the post-experiment questionnaire with variations for Study 2 in parentheses.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Hello. Many thanks for taking part in this experiment.
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in strategic
settings. All data obtained in this session will be anonymous and will be used
exclusively for scientific purposes.
After this introduction, we will describe you an scenario. You will have to
take a decision in that scenario and write it down in the answer sheet we will
provide you.
(Variation for Study 2: After this introduction, we will proceed in two in-
dependent phases. You will have to take a decision in each phase and write it
down in the answer sheets we will provide you.)
In this scenario, you will be anonymously matched with another participant.
In addition to the 5 euros show-up fee you will be able to obtain an additional 5
euros depending on the decisions you and the person you will be matched with
take.
After collecting the answer sheets, we will give you some time to answer a
short questionnaire. Once we collect the questionnaires, we will start calling
you to the desk by your ID number. The amount you have earnt will then be
paid to you in cash.
You must observe two rules:
1. Switch off your mobile phone.
2. Don’t talk during the session.
If you do not follow these rules, you will be asked to leave the session with
no compensation.
Finally, we ask you to:
1. Fill your ID number in your answer sheet and the questionnaire. If
you don’t do it, we won’t be able to pay you.
2. Read carefully the instructions on the answer sheet. If you don’t do
it, the data collected will be useless.
1
STUDY 1
Read carefully the following instructions:
You have been randomly matched with another participant in this session.
You will not know who you will be matched with.
You and that person will play the following game:
Each one of you should choose a number between 0 and 100 (both included)
with the objective of guessing 2/3 (two thirds) of the average of your two choices.
The one of you whose answer is closer to 2/3 of the average of the numbers
you have chosen will receive 5 euros in addition to the show up fee. If you both
pick the same number, that sum will be split between the two of you.
Take the time you need to answer. Once you do, write your choice in the
answer sheet and wait in silence until the rest of participants have finished.




Read carefully the following instructions:
You have been randomly matched with another participant in this session.
You will not know who you will be matched with.
You and that person will play the following game:
You are the coach of a team with 4 players. You and the person you have
been matched with should select 2 of your players to participate in a tournament.
In that tournament, each of your players will play with each of the players of
the other team. Hence, a tournament has four matches. You and the other
coach will select your two players without knowing the players chosen by the
other coach.
Each of your four players belongs to a type. The coach you have been
matched with has the same type of players available as you. Each type of player
wins against some type of opponents and loses against other types. If two players
of the same type play each other, they draw. The following table describes the




For each match one of your player wins you will receive 1 point, 0.5 if they
draw and 0 if they lose. The coach winning the tournament is the one receiving
most points. The winner will receive 5 euros in addition to the show up fee. In
case of a draw, that sum will be split between the two of you.
Next you will find the 4 words which describe the 4 types of players and
whose photographs appear in the table above. To select the 2 players that you
want to participate in the tournament tick the box corresponding to the word
that you think best describes the players you have selected (there is only one





Now, wait in silence until the rest of participants have finished.
Phase 2





Next, we will present you 4 photographs. You must associate each pho-
tograph with the word that you think best describes what the person in the
photograph is feeling or thinking. Just write the initial of the word (I, E, C
and R in Spanish). It may seem that more than a word is applicable to one
photograph, but there is only one correct answer. Before answering, make sure
you have read the four words and examined the four photographs carefully. If
you do not know the meaning of any of the words, raise your hand and we will
clarify that to you in private.




Please, answer the following questions in as much detail as you can.
1. How did you pick your number (the 2 players that you sent to the tour-
nament)?
2. Who do you think is better in this game, women or men? Why?
3. In general, who do you think obtains better results in strategic situations,
women or men? Why?
4. In average, who do you think picked higher numbers (obtained better
results in the phase where you had to assign words to photographs), women
or men?
4
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P o s i t iv e ( n e g a t iv e ) t - s t a t i s t i c s in d i c a t e t h a t t h e a c c um u la t e d f r e q u e n c y
o f f em a le (m a le ) p ay o ff s i s h ig h e r t h a n t h e o n e fo r m a le s ( f em a le s ) .
Table A2: Female-male DD Test t-statistics for expected payoff in Study 1.
6
Point Expected payoff Point "True" expected payoff
0.009 -0.025 0.013 -1.431
0.013 -1.042 0.028 -0.492
0.040 -1.497 0.036 -0.057
0.057 -1.510 0.039 -0.626
0.072 -1.579 0.045 -0.342
0.171 -1.254 0.081 -0.577
0.263 -1.606 0.118 -0.089
0.297 -0.986 0.200 0.089
0.309 -1.138 0.202 0.408
0.414 0.067 0.290 0.332
0.618 0.189 0.306 0.150
0.671 0.819 0.364 0.130
0.675 0.310 0.414 0.112
0.714 0.115 0.460 0.083
0.872 0.325 0.536 0.982
0.914 0.661 0.729 1.151
0.932 0.872 0.757 2.404**
0.802 2.491**
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency
of female (male) payoffs is higher than the one for males (females).
Table A3: Female-male DD Test t-statistics for expected payoffs in Study 2.
7
Point Expected payoff Point "True" expected payoff
0.009 -1.427 0.013 0.505
0.013 0.893 0.028 0.721
0.040 2.738*** 0.036 0.149
0.057 1.604 0.039 0.569
0.072 2.799*** 0.045 0.380
0.171 2.902*** 0.081 1.361
0.263 3.166*** 0.118 2.011**
0.297 2.634*** 0.200 1.671*
0.309 1.480 0.202 2.590***
0.414 1.027 0.290 1.952*
0.618 1.459 0.306 2.079**
0.671 1.857* 0.364 1.753
0.675 4.446*** 0.414 1.441
0.714 3.558*** 0.460 1.055
0.872 1.817* 0.536 0.123
0.914 2.461*** 0.729 1.074
0.932 2.518*** 0.757 0.073
0.802 0.109
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of payoffs
for those who believe the other sex is better is higher (lower) than for the rest.
Table A4: DD Test t-statistics for expected payoffs in Study 2 by belief in the other
sex is better at the game.
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C Appendix: Additional tables
Figure A1: Responses in the out-experiment sample to "Which sex is better at
this game?"
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